Non-technical summary
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and has received much criticism for this decision. In this paper, we explore possible justifications. The case against including money in the central bank's interest rate rule is based on a standard model of the monetary transmission process that underlies many contributions to research on monetary policy in the last two decades. Of course, if one allows for a direct effect of money on output or inflation as in the empirical "two-pillar" Phillips curves estimated in some recent contributions, it would be optimal to include a measure of (long-run) money growth in the rule. In this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by allowing for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and equilibrium interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary cross-checking and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential output. Such misperceptions cause a bias in policy setting. We find that cross-checking and changing interest rates in response to sustained deviations of long-run money growth helps the central bank to overcome this bias. Our argument in favor of ECB-style cross-checking does not require direct effects of money on output or inflation.
Introduction
Contrary to the monetary policy strategies of the U.S. Federal Reserve and many inflationtargeting central banks, which assign no special role to monetary aggregates, the European Central Bank has maintained a separate and important role for money in its two pillar strategy. The ECB distinguishes an 'economic' and a 'monetary' pillar: 1
• "Economic analysis assesses the short to medium-term determinants of price de- 
velopments. The focus is on real activity and financial conditions in the economy. The economic analysis takes account of the fact that price developments over those horizons are influenced largely by the interplay of supply and demand in the goods, services and factor markets."
• "Monetary analysis focuses on a longer-term horizon than the economic analy-
sis. It exploits the long-run link between money and prices. The monetary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking, from a medium to long-term perspective, the short to medium-term indications for monetary policy coming from the economic analysis."
In terms of economic theory, the long-run link noted by the ECB is related to the equation of exchange, that is, the definition of the velocity of money. Rewritten in growth terms it relates money growth, inflation and output growth to the change in velocity. In the long-run, once output growth and the change in velocity have settled down to trend, the equation of exchange implies a proportional relationship between money growth and inflation. In terms of empirics, this relationship has manifested itself most clearly in periods of very high inflation. Recent empirical assessments, however, have re-emphasized its validity in periods of moderate to low inflation in leading industrial economies. 2 On this basis, Gerlach (2003 Gerlach ( , 2004 has proposed to augment the standard Phillips curve, which accounts for shorter-term inflation dynamics, resource utilization gaps and inflationary shocks, with a measure of long-run or low-frequency money growth. 3 His estimates indicate a direct effect of filtered money growth on inflation. Such an augmented Phillips curve unifies the two pillars of the ECB in a single assessment of inflationary risks, and-if treated as a structural relationship-provides a rationale for including filtered money growth in the central bank's optimal interest rate rule. Consequently, optimal interest rate policy would embody a small but systematic response to ongoing monetary developments. The ECB's description of its strategy, however, does not rely on a direct effect of money on inflation in the Phillips curve. Rather, it 1 See http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2004en.pdf. 2 See, for example, Gerlach (2003 Gerlach ( , 2004 , ECB (2004), Haug and Dewald (2004, Pill and Rautanen (2006) , Gerlach (2006a, 2006b ). Bordo and Filardo (2006) consider different inflation zones including low inflation and deflation.
3 A similar proposal has been made by Neumann and Greiber (2004 
Δ is the first-difference operator. In the long-run, output growth and the change in velocity will settle down to trend and reveal a proportional relationship between money growth and inflation. In the short-run, however, fluctuations in velocity and output growth are likely to obscure this relationship. The behavior of velocity may be characterized as a function of the nominal interest rate, i, real output and money demand shocks, ε md , using a standard money demand equation:
Here, γ y denotes the income elasticity and γ i the semi-interest rate elasticity of money demand. Money demand shocks are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 md . Taking first differences, re-arranging (2) and combining with (1) we obtain:
Long-run equilibrium values (superscript *) can then be determined as follows. In the long-run, money demand shocks would average to zero, and the nominal interest rate would settle down to its steady state level. Thus, the long-run trend in velocity corresponds to Δv * t = (1 − γ y )Δy * t , and long-run inflation is proportional to long-run money growth adjusted for output and velocity trends: 6
Recent studies obtained empirical support for this long-run relationship using various filters or frequency-specific estimation. And more interestingly, they have found money growth to lead inflation at this frequency. To give an example, Gerlach (2004) uses the following filter
to approximate long-run values of inflation and money growth. In his work, μ t may alternatively stand for money growth, Δm t , or money growth adjusted for output growth.
In our paper we will follow equation (4) and adjust money growth using the estimate of the income-elasticity of money demand, i.e.
3 Monetary policy design without money
Most research on monetary policy rules in the last two decades has focused on models, in which the monetary transmission mechanism works as follows: the nominal interest rate affects the real interest rate due to price rigidity, the real rate influences the output gap via aggregate demand and the output gap impacts on inflation via a standard Phillips curve. Thus, monetary aggregates play no direct role in the transmission of policy from nominal interest rates to inflation. 7 Money supply instead is determined recursively from a money demand equation.
To illustrate this point we use a simple New-Keynesian style model with backwardlooking expectations in the spirit of Svenssson (1997), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Orphanides and Wieland (2000) . The model consists of a Phillips curve and an aggregate demand equation:
where
π t = Δp t denotes inflation, (ε π,t , ε y,t ) stand for zero-mean cost-push and demand shocks respectively with variances (σ 2 π , σ 2 y ), r * denotes the long-run equilibrium interest rate and the superscript e refers to market expectations, which we assume to be backwardlooking.
An inflation-targeting central bank would set the nominal interest rate i t in order to minimize expected discounted inflation deviations from target
where π * denotes the central bank's inflation target and δ its discount factor. Consequently, optimal monetary policy corresponds to a Taylor-style interest rate rule, which responds to lagged inflation and output gaps but not to money growth:
The superscript 'opt' refers to 'optimal'.
To be clear, the central bank achieves the desired interest rate setting by conducting open-market operations that influence the money supply. Thus, the money supply is determined according to the money demand equation (2) consistently with the desired policy rate, current output and the price level. However, money does not appear as a variable in the central bank's optimal interest rate rule and the remainder of the economy is automatically insulated from money demand shocks. Of course, the model defined by equations (7), (8), (10) and (2) also exhibits the long-run relationship between money growth and inflation discussed in the preceding section and emphasized by the ECB's monetary pillar.
The two-pillar Phillips curve and policy design
Inspired by the evidence for the long-run relationship between money and inflation, Gerlach (2003 Gerlach ( , 2004 proposed to include a filtered measure of money growth or adjusted money growth in the estimation of the short-run Phillips curve. A simplified version of the two-pillar Phillips curve is given by
where we define adjusted filtered money growth μ f t as in equations (5) and (6) and assume that the weights on filtered money growth and lagged inflation sum to one, i.e. α π = 1 − α μ .
In this subsection, we intend to make just one simple point. Namely, if any central bank were to consider this empirical two-pillar Phillips curve as a structural relationship 8 it would conclude that a measure of filtered money growth should enter in its interest rate rule. Replacing the standard accelerationist Phillips curve in (7) with the two-pillar Phillips curve (11) we proceed to derive the optimal interest rate rule for the model comprising equations (11), (8), (9) and (2):
The superscript 2p refers to the two-pillar Phillips curve underlying this rule. It is more complicated than the rule given by (10) because the nominal interest rate influences inflation not only via aggregate demand but also via a small contribution of current money supply to filtered money growth, μ f t . Substituting out this effect leaves us with the lagged interest rate and the lagged money demand shock in the rule. However, the most important new element is the lagged filtered (and adjusted) money growth rate μ f t−1 . Of course, if the coefficient on filtered money growth in the two-pillar Phillips curve, α μ , is set to zero, the interest rule again collapses to the specification without money in (10).
ECB-style cross-checking and policy design
The interest rate rule derived in the preceeding section can be viewed as a possible interpretation of the ECB's two pillar strategy. Our understanding, however, is that the ECB's strategy as stated does not require a direct effect of money on inflation in the Phillips curve. The ECB's description of cross-checking suggests to us that it uses the monetary pillar to accumulate evidence signalling trend changes in inflation. The monetary pillar appears to stand for the ECB's concern for 'robustifying' its policy under uncertainty and is subjected to regular scrutiny and learning.
Thus, we develop an alternative characterization of ECB-style cross-checking that stays as close as possible to the ECB's own description. Our proposed interest rate rule has two components:
Here the superscript CC refers to cross-checking, EA to the interest rate setting implied by the ECB's 'economic analysis' and MA to an additive adjustment in interest rate setting that arises from the ECB's 'monetary analysis'. We set the first component equal to the optimal interest rate rule in the baseline model:
This interest rate setting should ensure that inflationary risks based on a standard Phillips curve are controlled perfectly and inflation fluctuates randomly around the mean, π * .
However, this component relies on knowledge of unobservables such as the equilibrium real interest rate, r * , or potential output, y * , that may be subject to large and persistent policy misperceptions.
The second component, i MA t , is novel and captures the idea of cross-checking using the long-run relationship between money and inflation. This component is additive and persistent, because it is intended to offset persistent policy biases due to imperfect information. We assume that the central bank regularly tests whether filtered and adjusted money growth, μ f , still averages around the inflation target. Thus, the central 6 bank computes the normally-distributed test statistic,
and checks whether κ deviates from a critical value κ crit . σ μ f denotes the standard deviation when i EA t = i opt is implemented with correct values of potential output and the mean of μ f corresponds to π * . If the central bank obtains successive signals of a sustained deviation from target, i.e. (κ > κ crit for N periods) or (κ < −κ crit for N periods), it responds by adjusting interest rates accordingly. 9
As long as i EA t = i opt t is implemented with full knowledge of potential output, y * t and the real equilibrium rate, r * , cross-checking with regard to i MA t will almost never lead to an adjustment in interest rates. Under imperfect knowledge, however, cross-checking may once in a while have a very important effect on interest rate policy. 10 6 Cross-checking and policy misperceptions Recent research exploiting data on historical revisions to real-time estimates of the output gap has identified very persistent policy misperceptions. 11 The persistence of measurement errors arises primarily from biased estimates of unobservable potential output, since revisions to actual output decline more rapidly than those to the output gap. Thus, if a central bank relies on potential output measures in policy design, its policy stance may be biased for a sustained period of time. To illustrate this effect we define the policymaker's estimate of potential output,ŷ * t = y * t + bias t , as the sum of true potential output and a measure of the misperception denoted by bias t , and include it in the baseline rule:
9 The response coefficient on inflation deviations from target is the same as in i EA t , namely 1 α y β r . 10 The two parameters of i MA t , κ crit and N play different roles. κ crit reflects the probability that an observed deviation of μ f from π is purely accidental (for example a 5% or 1% significance level). N defines the number of successive deviations in excess of this critical value. Thus, the greater N the longer the central bank waits to accumulate evidence of a sustained policy bias. For example, if κ crit is set to the 1% critical value for the normal distribution (2.575) and the critical number of periods of sustained deviations N is set to 4, the probability of such an event in the absence of policy misperceptions would be less than 10 −8 .
11 See Orphanides (2003) and who estimate a worst-case process of misperceptions with a near unit root (0.96) and standard deviation of 3.77% using quarterly revisions from 1966 to 1994.
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The resulting bias in interest rate policy will induce a persistent deviation of inflation from target. For example, if the central bank's estimate of potential output were to remain permanently 1% above its true level (i.e. bias t = 1∀t), average inflation would increase by (α y β r )(β r ) −1 percentage points.
To illustrate this point further we calibrate the model with the standard Phillips curve and backward-looking expectations defined by equations (7), (8) and (2). The calibration of the parameters is summarized in Table 1 . We then simulate the interest rate rule (17) (2004)).
Interest rate elasticity of money demand (in line with Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004) with the following sequence of policy misperceptions:
for t = (1, 10) bias(t) = 0 for t = (11, 12, 13, 14) bias(t) = (1, 2, 3, 4) for t = (15, 100) bias(t) = 4 for t = (101, 102, 103) bias(t) = (3, 2, 1)
The central bank's initial estimate of potential output is assumed to coincide with the true value. In periods 11 to 14 the central bank begins to overestimate potential output leading to a bias of 4% from period 14 onwards. In the calibrated model this misperception will cause a bias of -4% in the central bank's interest rate response to short-run inflationary risks. Ultimately, this policy bias will induce an increase in average inflation of 2 percentage points. Accordingly, money growth and the long-run level of nominal interest rates will also rise by 2 percentage points. ¿From period 100 onwards the central bank's overestimate of potential output declines to 1% and the resulting deviation in 8 average inflation to 0.5 percentage points. Given the many alternative sources of short-run fluctuations in inflation the persistent increase due to policy misperceptions cannot be immediately read from inflation realizations. Nevertheless, the filtered measures of inflation, π f , and money growth, Δm f , eventually reveal the increase in average money growth and inflation. This simulation shows how policy misperceptions regarding potential output would render the long-run relationship between money growth and inflation quite apparent in the data. In the short run, however, money growth may deviate substantially from inflation due to movements in interest rates and output as well as money demand shocks.
This simulation emphasizes the weakness of the policy rule, i EA t = i opt , in the event of persistent misses on potential output. A similar effect would arise from incorrect estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate r * . Of course, one may argue that the process of misperceptions in (17) is an extreme example and that the central bank will learn from its mistakes. Thus, we proceed to show that cross-checking as defined by the rule in equation (16) provides a convenient and effective avenue for learning and correcting the central bank's policy bias.
We repeat the preceding simulation using the cross-checking rule, i CC t , defined by (16) which includes an additive and persistent adjustment in the event of sustained deviations of filtered (adjusted) money growth from target. The outcome is reported in Figure 2 . We have dropped the panel with actual money growth, Δm, and have instead included a panel reporting the bias in the central bank's estimate of potential output, bias t , and the adjustment in interest rates due to monetarist cross-checking. This adjustment corresponds to i MA t as defined in equations (15) )(bias t−1 ). Once the misperception of potential output declines after period 100, cross-checking soon leads to another adjustment of interest rates. In the preceding simulation the parameters of the cross-checking rule were set as follows: κ crit was set to the 1% critical value (2.575) and the number of periods required for a sustained deviation, N, was equal to 4 periods. The parameter λ, which determines how flexibly filtered money growth, μ f t , responds to innovations was set to 0.2.
To assess the sensitivity of our findings we draw 1000 series of shocks of length 200 from a normal distribution and use them to conduct a set of alternative simulations.
Some of the findings are reported in Figure 3 . The bottom left panel of Figure 3 reports the average path of the interest rate adjustment due to monetary cross-checking, i.e. i MA t , over 1000 simulations under the same parameter settings as in the single simulation displayed in Figure 2 . This panel confirms that, on average, cross-checking leads to the appropriate interest rate adjustments offsetting the policy bias due to output gap misperceptions. The other panels in Figure 3 consider alternative values of λ and κ crit .
Reducing λ to 0.1 implies smoother filtering of money growth. Consequently, it takes longer to detect a persistent change and the interest adjustment from cross-checking Lowering κ crit to the 5-percent level (i.e. 1.96) renders cross-checking more sensitive to trend changes in money growth. Consequently, the interest-rate adjustments happen somewhat earlier in the second column of panels than in the first column.
Outlook
We have reviewed two possible rationales for including a smoothed measure of money growth in the central bank's interest rate rule. First, we have confirmed that the two-pillar Phillips curve presented in the recent literature-if considered a structural relationshipwould provide such a rationale. More interestingly, however, we have also shown that money can still play a very useful role in the central bank's interest rate rule if the economy corresponds to a more standard model, which does not incorporate a direct effect of money on inflation.
We have presented a novel, formal characterization of ECB-style cross-checking. To Finally, our baseline model may be extended to render filtered money growth a leading indicator of filtered inflation, such that it clearly dominates filtered inflation as the object of cross-checking.
